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Abstract—Research and standardisation efforts in the fields of
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) and the Internet of Things
(IoT) are leading towards the adoption of TCP/IP for deploy-
ments of networks of severely constrained smart embedded ob-
jects. As a result, wireless sensors can now be uniquely identified
by an IPv6 address and thus be directly connected to and
reachable from the internet. This has a series of advantages but
also exposes sensor deployments to new security vulnerabilities.
Should a deployment be compromised, post-incident analysis can
provide information about the nature of the attack by inspecting
the network’s state and traffic during the time period prior,
during and after the attack. In this paper we adopt traffic forensic
techniques in order to achieve post-hoc detection of attacks
against availability in IPv6-based Low-Power Wireless Personal
Area Networks. To this end, we first implement an attack which
exploits inherent vulnerabilities of the IPv6 Routing Protocol
for Low-Power and Lossy Networks (RPL). Subsequently, we
present an automated method to detect and analyse this attack
by examining network packet captures.
Index Terms—6LoWPAN Forensics, Traffic Forensics, Wireless
Sensor Networks
I. INTRODUCTION
The development of standards-compliant TCP/IP stacks for
embedded devices has been among the key enablers for the
development of Internet of Things applications. The Institute
of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)’s 802.15.4 stan-
dard for low-power wireless communications is among the key
building blocks of WSN deployments. IPv6 over Low Power
Wireless Personal Area Networks (6LoWPAN) [1] and related
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) specifications [2], [3]
have made it possible to use IPv6 in networks of networked
embedded smart objects. For those networks, the RPL [4] is
the de-facto standard for routing.
The adoption of protocols of the TCP/IP family has made
WSNs vulnerable to new security threats. For instance, the
Internet Control Message Protocol Version 6 (ICMPv6) is used
to perform key functions in IPv6 networks, one of which is
Neighbor Discovery (ND). IPv6 ND’s security vulnerabilities
have been previously documented [5], [6], while a detailed
overview of 6LoWPAN security threats and countermeasures
is presented in [7].
Additionally, IPv6 Routing Protocol for Low-Power and
Lossy Networks (RPL) itself has vulnerabilities that have been
discussed by the research and standardisation communities: It
is susceptible to selective forwarding, wormhole and sinkhole
attacks [8]–[11], which can result in loss of data integrity,
availability and confidentiality. The RPL specification defines
some security counter-measures aiming to achieve confiden-
tiality, integrity and replay protection [4]. Possible solutions
have also been contributed by the academic community, such
as VeRA [8]. However, these mechanisms are not widely
adopted yet. For instance, the RPL implementation in the
Contiki open source operating system for the IoT does not
support any of them. Among the possible causes are problems
with RPL’s complexity and implementability, some of which
have been previously documented [12]. Additionally, some
of RPL’s security services rely on the Advanced Encryption
Standard (AES). Due to processing constraints of nodes form-
ing 6LoWPANs, there is no well-established method for key
negotiation and agreement. Recent research has demonstrated
the feasibility of Elliptic Curve-based approaches [13].
In case of an incident, post-hoc analysis can provide
information about the nature of the attack as well as the
mechanisms used to implement it. The Contiki embedded
Operating System for the Internet of Things (IoT) provides
mature support for several of the aforementioned standards
and specifications and it is this a very suitable platform for
research in this area.
In this context, this paper’s contributions are the following:
• We implement and demonstrate the feasibility of an attack
against RPL. In doing so, we bring out the necessity for
forensic readiness of IPv6-connected WSNs.
• Using this attack as a use-case, we present an automated
method for the post-hoc incident detection and analysis
through an examination of 6LoWPAN traffic captures.
II. RELATED WORK
Previous work on forensic analysis of WSN traffic has
predominantly relied on powerful observer nodes forming part
of a WSN deployment. For instance, a network of investigator
nodes has been proposed as a solution for digital investigations
of wormhole attacks [14]. Those observers are responsible
for capturing sensor node behaviour and of forwarding this
information to the network’s base station. The same work
proposes a set of algorithms to analyse evidence, in order
to identify collaborating malicious nodes and to reconstruct
wormhole attack scenarios.
In a similar fashion, it has been demonstrated that a digital
forensic readiness layer can be added over a pre-deployed
IEEE 802.15.4 WSN [15], by the addition of powerful forensic
nodes. They capture all WSN data plane traffic and maintain
frame authenticity and integrity. This work mainly focuses on
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Fig. 1. RPL Rank Exploitation
the reduction of time and cost involved in performing a digital
investigation and demonstrates the ability to collect evidence
without any modification to an existing network.
Powerful observer nodes with the ability to analyse traffic
and detect attacks have been adopted by the work documented
in [16]. Observers can detect various patterns, such as worm-
hole, black-hole, sinkhole and sybil attacks. Only illegitimate
behaviour is forwarded to the network’s base station, thus
reducing communication overheads.
In a different approach without observers, a remote live
forensic protection framework has been proposed aiming to
prevent the execution of illegitimate software on sensor de-
vices [17]. Nodes are capable of notifying their peers about an
intrusion as soon as they get tampered with. The framework
uses sand-boxing to restrict a running application’s memory
access to within a legitimate memory space. It also proposes
techniques aiming to prevent the execution of malicious code
by validating software authenticity.
Foren6 is a recent research effort aiming to provide diag-
nostic and debugging capability for 6LoWPANs [18]. It is a
passive monitoring tool capable of collecting information from
multiple, potentially mobile sniffers. Foren6 stores a history
of network state and topology changes, called versions, and
provides the ability to navigate through the entire history in a
post-hoc fashion through a network visualiser. Its current ver-
sion primarily focuses on network debugging and diagnostics
but lacks automated incident detection.
SVELTE [11] is an IDS for 6LoWPAN / RPL networks
that adopts a hybrid centralised - distributed approach. The
centralised component is executed on the network’s Border
Router and uses three modules. The distributed component
runs on all network nodes and also uses three modules which
complement the centralised component.
It has been demonstrated that compressed sensing tech-
niques can be employed in order to overhear encrypted wire-
less transmissions, detect the traffic’s periodic components
and ultimately reveal the type of application deployed in the
network [19]. In this work, the authors are discussing the
attacker’s side, but similar principles could be adopted to
conduct traffic analysis for forensic purposes.
The IETF is currently undertaking standardisation efforts in
the field of Intrusion Detection and Defence in RPL networks.
Fig. 2. Simulated Network Topology
A recently published Internet Draft presents a classification of
Intrusion Detection System (IDS) architectures which could
be applicable to RPL deployments [20]. The document sub-
sequently discusses data source location, collection frequency
and intrusion response in a context of RPL networks. This
work in progress is still at a very early stage.
III. RPL VERSION AND RANK EXPLOITATION
RPL is a Distance-Vector routing protocol and perceives the
network as a tree-like structure called a Destination Oriented
Directed Acyclic Graph (DODAG). Data traffic normally flows
from members of the network towards the DODAG root
(upwards). Data can also travel downwards, on a path from
nodes closer to the root towards nodes further away. According
to the RFC, support for this type of data flow is optional.
RPL control plane packets are transported inside ICMPv6
datagrams. DODAG Information Solicitation (DIS) messages
are probes, DODAG Information Object (DIO) messages ad-
vertise the presence of a DODAG and are used to form ‘up-
wards’ paths. Lastly Destination Advertisement Object (DAO)
messages are used to construct downward paths. The sender of
a DAO message can optionally request an acknowledgement
(DAO-ACK).
DODAG formation and maintenance is based on a series of
criteria, such as the DODAG version, a node’s rank and link
metrics. Nodes with a lower rank are perceived to be closer to
the root than nodes with higher ranks. Therefore the minimum
rank across the entire DODAG corresponds to its root. Link
metrics are determined by Objective Functions (OFs), which
are not defined as part of the RPL specification. OFs are also
used to calculate node ranks.
The basic principle of a rank exploitation attack is illustrated
in Fig. 1. The attacker transmits malicious RPL DIO messages
advertising a low rank. These DIOs lead the node under attack
to believe that the malicious node can provide a better path
towards the DODAG root and selects it as its parent. As
a result, the compromised node and all its children in the
tree lose connectivity to the rest of the network. If adequate
protective mechanisms are not in place, such as encryption of
application layer traffic, the same attack can also compromise
data confidentiality and integrity.
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Fig. 3. RPL Rank Exploitation Attack. The right-hand side of the network gets isolated.
IV. USE-CASE AND TRAFFIC CAPTURE IMPLEMENTATION
To conduct our investigations, we simulate a 6LoWPAN
with the Cooja simulator, which is distributed as part of the
Contiki OS1. Cooja simulates IEEE 802.15.4 networks and
includes a plugin which can export all network traffic as a
standard packet capture file (PCAP), suitable for processing
and analysis with Wireshark2 and similar tools. However, it
is not normal to assume that capturing all network traffic
would be feasible in a real deployment. Therefore, inside
the simulated network we position network sniffers which
capture traffic within their vicinity. We subsequently merge the
captured PCAP files and use them to conduct our analysis. To
confirm the validity of the merged PCAP file, we compared it
with the one exported by Cooja and verified that the merged
capture is a subset of the entire network traffic. In other words,
we verify that the merge does not introduce any erroneous
traffic, all frames in the merged PCAP file are also encountered
in the one exported by Cooja.
A sample network setup is presented in Fig. 2. Node 1 is
the DODAG root, node 2 is the attacker, nodes 4 and 24-27
are passive sniffers and the remainder are normal RPL nodes.
To implement the attack with Contiki, we use as a starting
point the standard code used for DODAG root nodes or RPL
router nodes and make the following changes:
1) We suppress DIS messages. This prevents the malicious
node from probing for existing networks. This is not
strictly required.
2) We listen for incoming DIO messages as normal. In
doing so, the malicious node keeps a record of the
network’s current DODAG version [4], as advertised by
the root and other nodes.
The attacker subsequently has two options: It can either join
the network as a normal node or it can impersonate a Border
Router. In the former case, the attacker will behave like a
normal node, but it will pretend to offer a very good path to
the DODAG root by advertising a very low rank. In the latter
1http://www.contiki-os.org
2http://www.wireshark.org/
case, it ignores DIO messages and therefore does not join an
existing network.
The attacker then assumes normal operation, advertising
a network of identical parameters as the ones used by the
existing deployment in exactly the same fashion as a legitimate
node would do.
The attack is illustrated in Fig. 3. Node 2 attacks nodes 8, 20
and 22 causes a total of 6 nodes to get partitioned out of the
network, with the compromised network topology displayed
in Fig. 3b.
The success of the rank exploitation attack depends on ranks
advertised by nodes as well as on path metrics between nodes.
Consider nodes 2, 11 and 20 in Fig. 3. In order for the attack
from node 2 against node 20 to work, node 2’s rank plus the
path cost between nodes 20 and 2 must be lower than node 11’s
rank plus the cost of the path between nodes 20 and 11. If this
is the case, node 20 is led to believe that node 2 offers a better
path to the DODAG root and selects it as its new parent. All
traffic passing through node 20 is forwarded to node 2 and this
constitutes an availability breach. Furthermore, if application
layer traffic is not encrypted, there is also the possibility of
confidentiality and integrity breaches, depending on node 2’s
behaviour.
V. TRAFFIC ANALYSIS AND INCIDENT DETECTION
Post-incident detection and analysis of an attack play an
important role in determining the root cause of a problem
and the various events and entities involved in the attack.
Determining the problem is useful for improving network
security and identifying existing network vulnerabilities. After
the attack, we are provided with a packet capture which
includes network traffic before, during and after the incident.
Information available to the investigator is that an incident has
taken place, the identifiers of compromised nodes (in our case
IPv6 addresses) and the nature of the compromise (in our case
that the nodes in question suddenly became unreachable over
the network). The investigator aims to determine the exact
steps that led to the incident.
For instance, assume that node X was reachable until time
T0 and then at some point after time T1 it became unreachable.
We look for suspicious activity between times T0 and T1
which could have influenced X’s connectivity. For example,
we observe that node X was sending DAO messages to node
Y until time T0. At some point between T0 and T1 node X
stopped sending DAOs to Y and started sending DAOs to the
malicious node (M) instead. M was not visible in the capture
before T0 but it appeared between T0 and T1. This could
be part of normal network activity, whereby M would be a
node that recently joined the network, or it could be a sign of
malicious activity.
To detect and confirm the presence of a malicious node,
we need behavioural analysis incorporating a temporal ele-
ment. Below, we provide the algorithm for detecting network
anomalies:
1) We scan the packet capture for DAO messages. DAO
messages are sent by the node to its parent to inform
about their own presence and to advertise a ‘downward’
path towards their DODAG children. Since the capture
provides information about the network state before
the incident, we are aware of node parent-child rela-
tionships. Any changes in the parent-child or network
topology could be detected by inspecting the source and
destination of DAO messages.
2) Changes in the network topology are normally triggered
by DIO messages, which are sent periodically by nodes
and which typically have a link-local broadcast IPv6
destination and therefore get transmitted as broadcast
frames at the link layer. Nodes listen for DIOs and use
the information therein to select a parent that minimizes
the cost of the path towards the DODAG root. Following
the event mentioned in the previous step, we look for a
DIO message which may have been sent by a malicious
node. However, there is a possibility that the network
topology change is genuine and their is no malicious
intent. The presence of malicious activity is further
confirmed by the following two steps.
3) Since the lost node has chosen a new parent, it may have
decreased its rank. Node ranks are advertised inside RPL
messages and are easy to extract from the capture. Any
abrupt, significant rank decrease may signify that the
compromised node has chosen a malicious parent.
4) As discussed previously, the malicious node may itself
be acting either as a normal node or it may be imper-
sonating a border router. In the latter case, it will not be
sending out DIS and DAO messages. This information
can also be retrieved by examining the packet capture.
5) Among all parent change occurrences, we record par-
ent IPv6 addresses and the number of parent switches
related to this node. Based on the assumption that
a malicious node is not present in the network right
from the start, we search for DIOs sent by these IPv6
addresses, which advertise a very low rank and which
were not present during the early time windows included
*************************************************************
*   Node:                      Count :      First DIO seen @:     First DIO Rank* 
*************************************************************
fe80::212:740f:f:f0f        1            1.818000                  2124 
fe80::212:7411:11:1111      3            2.567000                  2712 
fe80::212:740e:e:e0e        4            3.597000                  3404 
fe80::212:7413:13:1313      1            2.726000                  2712 
fe80::212:7416:16:1616      1            6.618000                  4534 
fe80::212:741c:1c:1c1c      1            4.716000                  3992 
fe80::212:740d:d:d0d        1            7.055000                  5174 
fe80::212:7402:2:202       6           88.554000                  257 
Fig. 4. Snippet from the tool’s output. DIO timestamps and advertised ranks
in the capture.
6) Nodes present in the network will normally transmit
or forward application layer traffic in either direction.
If application layer traffic was present in the network
between times T0 and T1, the packet capture can reveal
the location at which this traffic got dropped.
7) If multiple nodes become unresponsive at approximately
the same point in time, we can co-relate the events
that led to the incident. For example, if multiple nodes
became unresponsive after switching to the same new
parent, this increases the likelihood that this parent was
acting maliciously.
VI. IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION
We implemented the traffic capturing with a tool devel-
oped in-house and the merging using mergecap, which is
distributed as part of Wireshark. Subsequently, to extract
events of interest from the merged capture and to detect the
presence of malicious nodes, we extended the open source
Foren6 toolkit [18]3. Foren6 parses PCAP files and stores
information about captured datagrams in very detailed data
structures. Once loading a PCAP file is complete, we go
through all captured datagrams and we use the Foren6 internal
data representations to extract information contained inside
DIS, DIO and DAO messages, to detect events of interest and
to generate our reports. The same data structures also help us
record the paths of application layer traffic. Packets analysed
by Foren6 are further filtered in order to make sure we have
no duplicates.
When we encounter any message that signifies a parent
change, we extract its source and destination IPv6 addresses
and verify whether it was a consequence of a prior message,
based on the algorithm discussed in the previous section. A
snippet of the tool’s output is presented in Fig. 4. Observe
that the last row corresponds to a node which i) first started
sending DIO messages long after the capture’s start time and
ii) advertises a very low rank. The second column lists the total
number of devices which selected the node as their parent. A
second snippet showing rank decreases and parent changes for
an individual node is displayed in Fig. 5.
By conducting traffic analysis, we can identify events of
potential interest and present them to the forensic investigator.
The tool outputs the following information:
3http://cetic.github.io/foren6/
******************************************************
*          Timestamp Rank for fe80::212:7416:16:1616                      *
******************************************************
  07.483000: fe80::212:7416:16:1616    --> fe80::212:740b:b:b0b     
  10.341000:       3499
  15.083000:       1694
  24.462000:       1312
  39.404000:       1270
  68.348000:       1152
  89.704000:        897
  90.772000: fe80::212:7416:16:1616    --> fe80::212:7402:2:202     
  93.109000:        799
  97.657000:        685
107.083000:        603
123.486000:        487
Fig. 5. Snippet from the tool’s output: Rank decreases and parent switches
1) All nodes, their parents and a timestamp of every parent
change, ordered by timestamp.
2) Rank decrease details of all nodes involved in parent
changes.
3) A list of all nodes in the network and whether they were
the source of DIS, DIO or DAO messages.
4) A list of all nodes acting as the new parent during a
parent switch event, alongside a count of nodes selecting
them as a parent, the timestamp of their first outgoing
DIO and the rank advertised therein.
5) The ranks advertised by nodes acting as parents.
By presenting this information in a human-readable form
and by flagging events of interest, the investigator can apply
his/her domain expertise to less mundane tasks in a more time-
efficient manner.
A. Evaluation
To evaluate the effectiveness of our work, we ran two
experiments in networks consisting 1 legitimate Border Router,
20 normal nodes, a single attacker and a host of sniffers. In
the first experiment the attacker impersonated an alternative
Border Router whereas in the second it acted as normal node.
For this pilot evaluation, we positioned sniffers in such a way
as to capture all network traffic. Testing our mechanism with
partial traffic captures is part of our future work.
For the first experiment, the malicious host was not sending
out DAO messages. With the output from our tool, identify-
ing sighting the malicious node is straightforward based on
information numbered 1) and 4) in the previous sub-section.
In the second experiment, whereby the malicious node
acts as a normal router, detection is more complicated. In
this scenario, it behaves in every respect as a legitimate
node, sending out DAO messages and generally operating
in a stealthy fashion. Detection is achieved based on sudden
connectivity loss events for other nodes, abrupt rank decreases,
DIOs advertising very low ranks, and lost application layer
traffic.
Fig. 6 illustrates the speed of the analysis using our tool for
PCAP captures of increasing sizes. The numbers were obtained
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Fig. 6. Analysis duration vs PCAP size
on a standard desktop PC. The X axis corresponds to the
number of datagrams in the PCAP, while the Y axis displays
the total duration of the analysis in seconds. The values shown
include the time needed for Foren6 to parse the PCAP as well
as the time it took for our extensions to analyse the traffic,
detect events of interest and generate the report.
B. Countermeasures
The version and rank exploitation attack can be addressed
through the following countermeasures:
1) Enabling DAO-ACK messages. DAO-ACK messages
are sent by a DAO recipient in response to a unicast
DAO [4]. Enabling DAO-ACK messages will assist in
identifying malicious activity and can also be used as
part of an intrusion detection system.
2) White lists of legitimate IPv6 addresses, maintained by
every network node in order to avoid communication
with malicious nodes. This approach has several draw-
backs, primarily related to the potential high churn rate
of those networks which would make the integrity of
such white lists very difficult to maintain. Additionally,
this approach would not scale well with networks con-
taining large numbers of nodes [10].
3) Enabling RPL’s authenticated mode, whereby nodes
need to authenticate themselves before joining a network
as (non-routing) hosts. In order to join as a router, a
node has to obtain a second key from a key authority.
This mode of secure operation is briefly discussed in the
RPL specification [4]. However, according to the same
document, authenticated mode cannot be implemented
with symmetric keys and “RPL supports only symmet-
ric algorithms: authenticated mode is included for the
benefit of potential future cryptographic primitives”.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this work we have presented a traffic analysis tool which
can identify attacks against RPL in 6LoWPANs, flag events of
interest and present the analysis results it to an investigator in
a human readable format. As part of our future work we aim to
improve the algorithm’s accuracy. Additionally, we plan to run
further experiments in order to investigate the accuracy of our
approach when the traffic captures provide reduced network
coverage. Part of this task will be an attempt to reconstruct
the network topology based on incomplete information.
This work is complementary to our RAM extraction and
carving tool for devices used in those networks [21]. By
combining an analysis of network activity with an analysis
of the RAM contents of network nodes, we can reveal useful
information about the events that led to a security incident. As
part of our future work we plan to integrate those two works
into a single toolkit.
REFERENCES
[1] G. Montenegro, N. Kushalnagar, J. W. Hui, and D. E. Culler, “Trans-
mission of IPv6 packets over IEEE 802.15.4 networks,” RFC 4944, Sep.
2007.
[2] J. Hui (Ed.) and P. Thubert, “Compression format for IPv6 Datagrams
over IEEE 802.15.4-Based Networks,” RFC 6282, Sep. 2011.
[3] Z. Shelby (Ed.), S. Chakrabarti, E. Nordmark, and C. Bormann, “Neigh-
bor discovery optimization for low-power and lossy networks,” RFC
6775, Nov. 2012.
[4] T. Winter (Ed.), P. Thubert (Ed.), A. Brandt, J. Hui, R. Kelsey, P. Levis,
K. Pister, R. Struik, J. P. Vasseur, and R. Alexander, “RPL: IPv6 Routing
Protocol for Low power and Lossy Networks,” RFC 6550, Mar. 2012.
[5] P. Nikander (Ed.), J. Kempf, and E. Nordmark, “IPv6 Neighbor Discov-
ery (ND) Trust Models and Threats,” RFC 3756, May 2004.
[6] A. Alsa’deh and C. Meinel, “Secure neighbor discovery: Review, chal-
lenges, perspectives, and recommendations,” IEEE Security Privacy,
vol. 10, no. 4, pp. 26–34, July 2012.
[7] A. Le, J. Loo, A. Lasebae, M. Aiash, and Y. Luo, “6LoWPAN: a study
on QoS security threats and countermeasures using intrusion detection
system approach,” International Journal of Communication Systems,
vol. 25, no. 9, pp. 1189–1212, Sep. 2012.
[8] A. Dvir, T. Holczer, and L. Buttyan, “VeRA - version number and rank
authentication in RPL,” in Mobile Adhoc and Sensor Systems (MASS),
2011 IEEE 8th International Conference on, Oct. 2011, pp. 709–714.
[9] T. Tsao, R. K. Alexander, M. Dohler, V. Daza, A. Lozano, and
M. Richardson (ed), “A security threat analysis for routing protocol for
low-power and lossy networks (RPL),” Internet Draft (version 06), Dec.
2013, (draft-ietf-roll-security-threats).
[10] L. Wallgren, S. Raza, and T. Voigt, “Routing Attacks and Countermea-
sures in the RPL-Based Internet of Things,” International Journal of
Distributed Sensor Networks, vol. 13, no. 794326, 2013.
[11] S. Raza, L. Wallgren, and T. Voigt, “SVELTE: Real-time Intrusion
Detection in the Internet of Things,” Ad Hoc Networks, vol. 11, no. 8,
pp. 2661–2674, Nov. 2013.
[12] T. Clausen and U. Herberg, “Some Considerations on Routing in
Particular and Lossy Environments,” in Proc. 1st Interconnecting Smart
Objects with the Internet Workshop, Mar. 2011.
[13] P. Ilia, G. Oikonomou, and T. Tryfonas, “Cryptographic Key Exchange
in IPv6-Based Low Power, Lossy Networks,” in Proc. Workshop in
Information Theory and Practice (WISTP 2013), ser. Lecture Notes in
Computer Science, vol. 7886. Springer, May 2013, pp. 34–49.
[14] B. Triki, S. Rekhis, and N. Boudriga, “Digital investigation of wormhole
attacks in wireless sensor networks,” in Proc. Eighth IEEE International
Symposium on Network Computing and Applications (NCA 2009), 2009,
pp. 179–186.
[15] F. Mouton and H. Venter, “A prototype for achieving digital forensic
readiness on wireless sensor networks,” in Proc. AFRICON, 2011, 2011,
pp. 1–6.
[16] S. Rekhis and N. Boudriga, “Pattern-based digital investigation of x-
hole attacks in wireless adhoc and sensor networks,” in Proc. Interna-
tional Conference on Ultra Modern Telecommunications & Workshops
(ICUMT ’09), 2009, pp. 1–8.
[17] A. Zaharis, A. I. Martini, L. Perlepes, G. Stamoulis, and P. Kikiras,
“Live forensics framework for wireless sensor nodes using sandboxing,”
in Proc. 6th ACM workshop on QoS and security for wireless and mobile
networks, ser. Q2SWinet ’10. ACM, 2010, pp. 70–77.
[18] S. Dawans and L. Deru, “Demo Abstract : Foren6, a RPL/6LoWPAN
Diagnosis Tool,” in Proc. 11th European Conference on Wireless Sensor
Networks (EWSN), Feb. 2014.
[19] A. Fragkiadakis and I. Askoxylakis, “Malicious traffic analysis in
wireless sensor networks using advanced signal processing techniques,”
in Proc. 14th International Symposium and Workshops on a World of
Wireless, Mobile and Multimedia Networks (WoWMoM), Jun. 2013, pp.
1–6.
[20] L. Zhang, G. Feng, and S. Qin, “Intrusion detection system for low-
power and lossy networks,” Internet Draft (version 00), Nov. 2013,
(draft-zhang-roll-rpl-intrusion-defence).
[21] V. Kumar, G. Oikonomou, T. Tryfonas, D. Page, and I. Phillips, “Dig-
ital Investigations for IPv6-Based Wireless Sensor Networks,” Digital
Investigation, vol. 11, Supplement 2, no. 0, pp. S66–S75, August 2014,
fourteenth Annual DFRWS Conference.
